This paper discusses the sequence of events involved in the accident which took place at the Three Mile Island Nuclear Plant in Pennsylvania, USA in 1979, the worst nuclear disaster in US history. The physical characteristics of the as-built reactor building are described, and the changes brought about by the accident on the plant structure are discussed. The current state of the plant and the materials of the reactor are also discussed.
INTRODUCTION
The Three Mile Island (TM!) nuclear power plant was built on a sandbar in the middle of Pennsylvania's Susquehanna River, just 10 miles downstream from the state capitol of Harrisburg. The principal structures on the island are two nuclear reactor buildings each containing two steam generators and four associated cooling towers. The reactor system is a Babcock and Wilcox 900MW Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR). The system uses a once through steam generator and has an unusually small primary coolant system volume. The plant's state-of-the-art Unit-2 reactor had been generating electricity for nearly a year when a minor malfunction occurred on March 28, 1979 at 4:00a.m. in the system which fed water to the steam generators at Unit-2. This malfunction led eventually to the most serious commercial nuclear accident in US history. Coincidentally, just twelve days earlier, a film called The China Syndrome had been released, providing a first look at a terrifying nuclear disaster. In the China Syndrome the core turns into a molten white-hot mass which penetrates the concrete base of the plant and reaches the ground water which is immediately below the foundation of the plant. Fracture of the earth then occurs instantly and geysers of radioactive steam are spouted into the air forming a radioactive cloud, similar to that created at Chernobyl, which leads to a widespread catastrophe.
THE TM! UNIT-2 REACTOR
The core region of the TMI Unit -2 reactor was contained within a pressure vessel made of low alloy steel of 4.3m inside diameter. A concrete wall of 7m inside diameter surrounded the pressure vessel. The purpose of the pressure vessel is to safely contain the core at the pressure and elevated temperature levels experienced in service. The concrete wall is a biological shield intended to absorb any fast neutrons and gamma rays emanating from the reactor. Dense materials are most effective for shielding, the three most commonly considered being water, concrete and lead. Concrete is an effective struc- 
DESCRIPTION OF THE CORE BEFORE THE ACCIDENT [3]
The fuel that was used was uranium dioxide (UO2) powder that has been pressed, sintered and ground to form cylindrical pellets, 9.4mm in diameter and 17.7mm in length. To create a fuel rod, the fuel pellets were stacked inside zircalloy-4 cladding tubes, 3.9m in length, 10.9mm outside diameter, and 9.6mm inside diameter. There were 208 fuel rods in each fuel assembly and the reactor contained 177 fuel assemblies. The assemblies contained three enrichment levels of U235, 1.98%, 2.64% and 2.96% by weight. The fuel assemblies were constructed with cladding covers to protect the fuel pellets from coolant corrosion. The overall diameter of the core was 3.27 m, and its active height was 3.66m. Inconel 718 spacer grids were used to space the fuel rod assemblies at both the top and bottom of the core.
The control rods consisted of Ag-In-Cd in tubes of 304 stainless steel. Axial power adjusting rods of Al2O3-B4C clad with grade Cf-3M stainless steel were also used, together with two fuel assemblies which contained UO2-Gd2O3 (gadolinia) test rods.
THE ACCIDENT
The accident sequence began at 4:00a.m. on 28 March 1979 when the main feedwater pumps shut down (tripped), not an unexpected or unusual event [4] . This resulted in an automatic shutdown of the turbine and caused the emergency feedwater pumps to start up. Unknown to the operators, the block valves on both of the emergency feedwater lines had been left closed, so that no water was able to reach the steam generators. Since no feedwater was entering the generators, the reactor coolant temperature increased and caused an expansion which raised the water level in the pressurizer. The pressure increase due to the compression of the steam in the top of the pressurizer, caused the pilot-operated relief valve (PORV) to open, and steam and water began flowing out of the reactor cooling circuit through a drain pipe to a drain tank on the floor of the containment building. The circuit pressure continued to rise and this caused an emergency shut-down, referred to as a SCRAM, of the reactor itself. However, since the core still had a residual heat generation of a few percent of full power caused by the decay of radioactive nuclides in the fuel, if the water level in the core drops enough to expose the upper portion of the core, the uncovered portion will heat up.
With the reactor shut down and the PORV open, the pressure in the primary circuit fell. The PORV was designed to close automatically when the pressure dropped to 15.2MPa, and although the control panel indicated it had closed 13 seconds into the accident, it had in fact remained open so that coolant was draining off. This continued for two and a half hours before the circuit was sealed by the closure of a backup valve. Owing to the cooling of the core due to the shut-down and the loss of coolant through the PORV, as the water level in the pressurizer began to fall the operators turned on a pump to add water to the system. However, because the inflow was greater than the outflow through the PORV, the water level in the pressurizer began to rise. The rate of rise of the water level was increased when the steam generators, starved of feedwater because of the closed block valves, boiled dry and caused the reactor coolant to heat up and expand.
Two minutes into the accident the reactor pressure dropped to a value low enough to activate the high pressure injection system (HPIS), which is part of the emergency core cooling system (ECCS). The emergency cooling water was pumped into the reactor at a rate of to cause any significant damage to the containment. Then after three days into the accident the main concern centered on the possibility of an explosion of hydrogen inside the reactor itself which might rupture the upper head of the pressure vessel and lead to the release of radioactive gases. For such an explosion to occur, oxygen would have had to be present in sufficient quantity to form an explosive mixture. Initial calculations suggested that the rate of generation of oxygen by radiolysis would be great enough to create an explosive mixture, but this calculation was later found to be in error. In addition, the hydrogen overpressure (6.9MPa) would have forced all of the oxygen produced to be recombined with hydrogen to form water. In any case, any danger of an explosion was removed when the hydrogen bubble broke up into smaller bubbles, which were readily eliminated.
FAULT TREE ANALYSIS [6]
It is instructive to analyze the accident causes and the allocation of responsibility using a fault tree approach, as has been done by Bradley [7] .
Fault tree analysis was introduced in 1961 by the Bell Telephone Laboratories for performing safety evaluations for space -launch programs. The technique has since been used by reliability engineers as a general predictive tool for modeling system failures and system fault modes. This type of analysis is used to examine systems in order to determine component failure modes and other events (e.g., operator errors, maintenance problems, etc.) that can individually or in combination with other events cause system failure. The analysis is a top-down, deductive process whereby the analyst starts with the undesired state of the system as defined in the event tree and then proceeds to examine the system, component by component, for those combinations of component fault states that result in the undesired system state. The approach is opposite to the inductive method of first postulating a component fault state and then determining the result. Fault tree analysis produces a logic diagram depicting the component failure modes and other fault events that can, through AND and OR combinatorial logic, produce system failure. The fault tree is a binary model of the fault modes of a system and can be converted to a probabilistic model of the system-a model in which element failure probabilities are assigned to individual elements and combined to obtain system failure probabilities involving the use of Boolean algebra and probability theory (Boolean algebra is a logical combinatorial system that represents symbolically relationships as implied by the linguistic operators AND and OR between entities). The various symbols used in the construction of a fault tree are shown and defined in Fig. 2 . An example of fault tree construction will now be given. A loss of cooling accident in a PWR requires that the containment spray injection system (CSIS) operate following a reactor cooling system break. for which the fault tree is constructed, and it becomes the top event of the tree, see Fig. 3 . There are two spray subsystems associated with the PWR, each of which is capable of supplying sufficient spray fluid to the containment. Both of these spray subsystems must fail in order to fail the system. Therefore the second level event "Insufficient Fluid From Spray Subsystem A Header Nozzles" and Insufficient
Fluid From Spray Subsystem B Header Nozzles" are related to the top undesired event by an AND gate. Had both subsystems been needed to reduce containment pressure these second level events would have been related to the top event by an OR gate, indicating 5 that either event would fail the system. The next or third level events on the fault tree identifies the fault events that result in the second level events. That is "Insufficient Fluid Flow Through Spray Subsystem A Header Nozzles" can be caused by "Spray Header Ruptures", "Containment Pressure Sufficiently High to Reduce Spray Effectiveness", "Spray Subsystem A Header-Nozzles Plugged", or "Insufficient Fluid Flow to Header". The four faults identified are all of the immediate faults sufficient to fail the component header-nozzles. Similar faults can be identified for the subsystem B header nozzles. Additional faults needed to bring about these third level events can be developed in additional levels of the fault tree if desired. In Fig. 3 , the event represented by the circle is a basic input event which is not developed further. The event represented by the diamond is a fault event, not necessarily a component failure, which is not expanded into all of its causes because there is insufficient available information to do so, or little additional information is expected to be learned by doing so. Rectangles represent faults for which the tree is developed further to identify more basic causes of failure. When completed the tree becomes a graphic representation of all component fault modes and other fault events that can fail the system. Bradley [7] has used a modification of the fault tree approach in the failure analysis of disasters which have already occurred in order to work back to the fundamental human error which contributed to the failure. In this approach there are no OR gates in the fault trees, only AND gates. Bradley proposed the use of the following error codes in failure analysis.
ERROR CODES Code Suffixes
A simplified fault tree for the TMI event is shown in Fig. 4 , and the failure sequence is made clear by use of the fault tree technique.
The fault tree developed by Bradley is more detailed, with the disaster code at TMI given by Fa3Fb2M1M2O1O23, a complex combination of equipment failure, management errors and operating errors. 6 The weld metal contained two features for quantification: the delta ferrite (required to prevent hot cracking) and the carbides in the delta ferrite. A modified Murakami's reagent (20g NaOH, 20g K3Fe(CN)6, 100ml waferrite. Murakami's reagent (10g NaOH, 10g K3Fe(CN)6. 100ml water) for 60-90 seconds at room temperature was used to reveal the carbides. An aqueous saturated picric acid solution containing a few drops of HCl per 100ml and a wetting agent (sodium tridecylbenzene sulfonate) was used at room temperature for 5-10 minutes to reveal the prior austenite grain size of the A533B steel. At temdelta ferrite in the control samples was found to decrease, as did the volume % of carbide within the delta ferrite. In addition the prior austenite grain size of the base material increased in this temperature range. By comparison with the TMI-2 samples it was estimated that the cladding may minutes. In addition, in one specimen numerous fissures were observed in the A533B steel normal to the weld metal interface, and a few small voids were found in another specimen.
CURRENT STATUS
Today, the TMI-2 reactor is permanently shut down and defueled, with the reactor coolant system drained, the radioactive water decontaminated and evaporated, radioactive waste shipped off site to an appropriate disposal site, reactor fuel andcore debris shipped off site to a Department of Energy facility, and the remainder of the site being monitored.
The owner, General Public Utilities Nuclear Corporation, says it will keep the facility in long-term, monitored storage until the operating license for the TMI-1 plant expires in 2014, at which time both plants will be decommissioned.
In addition, analyses have been made of the events which would have occurred had the flow of coolant had not been restarted in the later stages of the incident. The meltdown might have stopped or it might have proceeded until the molten fuel had ruptured the bottom of the steel pressure vessel and dropped into the basement of the reactor building. A number of analysts agree that even with a core meltdown there was only a small probability that the consequences of TMI would have been catastrophic to public health and safety. The most likely probability is that the reactor building would have survived (the building was designed to withstand a 333km/h impact of a Boeing 727), and the vast majority of radioactive material released from the fuel would have been retained within the building, and not released to the surrounding environment, i.e., there would have been no China Syndrome [7] . There was a large financial loss however, with the cost of replacement of the TM! Unit-2 being valued at over $1 billion [7] .
CONCLUSIONS
(1) Despite serious damage to Unit-2, the release of radioactive material was relatively small and presented a negligible hazard to the public. (2) The detailed causes of the accident continue to be debated to this day. However, based on a series of investigations, the main factors appear to have been a complex combination of equipment failure, management errors, and operating errors. It may also be that a part of the problem can be attributed to design errors because of lack of foresight into possible failure sequences. There is no doubt that the accident at Three Mile Island permanently changed both the nuclear industry and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in several ways, i.e., a. Public fear and distrust increased, and b. NRC's regulations and oversight became broader and more robust, and management of the plants was scrutinized more carefully. c. The problems identified from careful analysis of the events during the accident have led to permanent and sweeping changes in how NRC regulates its licensees, which, in turn, has strengthened public health and safety. (3) The use of fault tree analysis in defining the responsibility for an accident has been demonstrated. This may be a valuable tool in a number of failure investigations. (4) Based on the lessons from Three Mile Island, materials scientists and engineers have a much improved knowledge that even the most (apparently) unlikely failure scenarios must be addressed in the design of complex plants such as a nuclear rector, and that operating personnel need to be better trained to deal with the unexpected. Better control procedures and systems must be in place to prevent the recurrence of such an accident.
